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October 1, 2018 
Mr. Brent J. Fields 
Secretary 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
100 F Street, Northeast 
Washington, DC 20549 
 
Dear Mr. Fields:  
 
Enclosed is a petition for a rulemaking on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
disclosure authored by Osler Chair in Business Law Cynthia A. Williams, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, and Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law Jill E. Fisch, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, and signed by investors and associated organizations representing 
more than $5 trillion in assets under management including the California Public Employees' 
Retirement System (CalPERS), New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, Illinois State 
Treasurer Michael W. Frerichs, Connecticut State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, Oregon State 
Treasurer Tobias Read, and the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment.   
 
The enclosed rulemaking petition: 
 
 Calls for the Commission to initiate notice and comment rulemaking to develop a 
comprehensive framework requiring issuers to disclose identified environmental, social, 
and governance (ESG) aspects of each public-reporting company’s operations; 
 Lays out the statutory authority for  the SEC  to require ESG disclosure;  
 Discusses the clear materiality of ESG issues; 
 Highlights large asset managers’ existing calls for standardized ESG disclosure;  
 Discusses the importance of such standardized ESG disclosure for companies and the 
competitive position of the U.S. capital markets; and  
 Points to the existing rulemaking petitions, investor proposals, and stakeholder 
engagements on human capital management, climate, tax, human rights, gender pay 
ratios, and political spending, and highlights how these efforts suggest, in aggregate, that 
it is time for the SEC to bring coherence to this area. 
 
If the Commission or Staff have any questions, or if we can be of assistance in any way, please 
contact either Osler Chair in Business Law Cynthia A. Williams, Osgoode Hall Law School, 
who can be reached at (416) 736-5545, or by electronic mail at cwilliams@osgoode.yorku.ca; or 
Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law Jill E. Fisch, University of 









October 1, 2018 
          
Mr. Brent J. Fields 
Secretary 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
100 F Street, Northeast 
Washington, DC 20549 
 
Dear Mr. Fields,  
 
We respectfully submit this petition for rulemaking pursuant to Rule 192(a) of the Securities 




Today, investors, including retail investors, are demanding and using a wide range of 
information designed to understand the long-term performance and risk management strategies 
of public-reporting companies. In response to changing business norms and pressure from 
investors, most of America’s largest public companies are attempting to provide additional 
information to meet these changing needs and to address worldwide investor preferences and 
regulatory requirements. Without adequate standards, more and more public companies are 
voluntarily producing “sustainability reports” designed to explain how they are creating long-
term value. There are substantial problems with the nature, timing, and extent of these voluntary 
disclosures, however. Thus, we respectfully ask the Commission to engage in notice and 
comment rule-making to develop a comprehensive framework for clearer, more consistent, more 
complete, and more easily comparable information relevant to companies’ long-term risks and 
performance. Such a framework would better inform investors, and would provide clarity to 
America’s public companies on providing relevant, auditable, and decision-useful information to 
investors.  
 
 Introduction  
 
In 2014, the Commission solicited public comments to its “Disclosure Effectiveness” 
initiative, which sought to evaluate and potentially reform corporate disclosure requirements. 
Over 9,835 commenters have responded to that initiative.
2
 As part of that initiative, the 2016 
Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K (“Concept 
Release”)
3
 solicited public opinions on the frequency and format of current disclosure, company 
accounting practices and standards, and the substantive issues about which information should be 
disclosed. In that Concept Release, the SEC asked a number of questions about whether it should 
require disclosure of sustainability matters, which it defined as “encompass[ing] a range of 
topics, including climate change, resource scarcity, corporate social responsibility, and good 
                                                     
1
 Rule 192. Rulemaking: Issuance, Amendment and Repeal of Rules, Rule 192(a), By Petition, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/about/rules-of-practice-2016.pdf. 
2
 See Tyler Gellasch, Joint Report: Towards a Sustainable Economy: A review of Comments to the SEC’s Disclosure 




 Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Release No. 33-10064; 34-77599; File No. S7-06-




corporate citizenship. These topics are characterized broadly as ESG [Environmental, Social, and 
Governance] concerns.”
4
   
 
The SEC received over 26,500 comments in response to the 2016 Concept Release, making it 
one of only seven major proposals by the SEC since 2008 to garner more than 25,000 
comments.
5
 As noted in a report reviewing comments to the Concept Release, “the 
overwhelming response to the Concept Release seems to reflect an enormous pent up demand by 
disclosure recipients for more and better disclosure” generally.
6
 The Concept Release also 
provided the first formal opportunity since the mid-1970s for both reporting companies and 
disclosure recipients to convey their views to the SEC concerning what additional environmental 
or social information should be disclosed to complement the governance disclosure already 
required.    
 
 An analysis of the comments submitted in response to the Concept Release, a significant 
majority of which supported better ESG disclosure, can be found in the report referenced in 
footnote 2. Across the board, commenters noted how they were using those disclosures to 
understand companies’ potential long-term performance and risks. The response to the Concept 
Release strongly suggests that it is time for the Commission to engage in a rulemaking process to 
develop a framework for public reporting companies to use to disclose specific, much higher-
quality ESG information than is currently being produced pursuant either to voluntary initiatives 
or current SEC requirements.  
 
We briefly set out six arguments supporting this petition: 
 
(1) The SEC has clear statutory authority to require disclosure of ESG information, and 
doing so will promote market efficiency, protect the competitive position of American 
public companies and the U.S. capital markets, and enhance capital formation; 
 
(2) ESG information is material to a broad range of investors today; 
 
(3) Companies struggle to provide investors with ESG information that is relevant, reliable, 
and decision-useful; 
 
(4) Companies’ voluntary ESG disclosure is episodic, incomplete, incomparable, and 
inconsistent, and ESG disclosure in required SEC filings is similarly inadequate;  
 
(5) Commission rulemaking will reduce the current burden on public companies and provide 
a level playing field for the many American companies engaging in voluntary ESG 
disclosure; and  
 
(6) Petitions and stakeholder engagement seeking different kinds of ESG information 
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1. The SEC has Clear Statutory Authority to Require Disclosure of ESG Information  
 
As acknowledged by the SEC in its Concept Release, its statutory authority over disclosure 
is broad. Congress, in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, “authorize[d] the 
Commission to promulgate rules for registrant disclosure ‘as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.’”
7
 In an early defense of its power to require 
disclosure of corporate governance information such as the committee structure and 
composition of boards of directors—disclosure now considered standard, but which was 
controversial when the requirements were first promulgated—the SEC was explicit about the 
broad scope of its power over disclosure: 
The legislative history of the federal securities laws reflects a recognition that 
disclosure, by providing corporate owners with meaningful information about the way 
in which their corporations are managed, may promote the accountability of corporate 
managers. . . . Accordingly, although the Commission’s objective in adopting these 
rules is to provide additional information relevant to an informed voting decision, it 
recognizes that disclosure may, depending on determinations made by a company’s 
management, directors and shareholders, influence corporate conduct. This sort of 
impact is clearly consistent with the basic philosophy of the federal securities laws.
8  
In 1996, Congress added Section 2(b) to the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 23(a)(2) to 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. These parallel sections provide that: 
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is 
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of 




 These statutory policy goals underscore the SEC’s authority to require disclosure of better, 
more easily comparable, and consistently presented ESG information.  Generally, the SEC 
seeks to protect investors through requirements for issuers to disclose material information at 
specified times.
10
 Thus, the investor protection aspect of the SEC’s statutory authority will be 
discussed in Part Two, below, in conjunction with the discussion of the materiality of ESG 
information. Here we discuss why requiring issuers to disclose specified ESG information 







                                                     
7
 Concept Release, supra note 3, at 22-23 & fn. 50, citing Sections 7, 10, and 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77g(a)(10), 77j, and 77s(a); and Sections 3(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d), and 23(a) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78l, 78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d), and 78w(a).  
8
 Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate 
Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, 16 Docket 348, 350 (Dec. 6, 1978). 
9
 Securities Act of 1933, §2(b), 15 U.S.C.§ 77b(b); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 
§78w(a)(2)(2012). 
10
 See Concept Release, supra note 3, at 23 (stating that “our disclosure rules are intended not only to protect 
investors but also to facilitate capital formation and maintain fair, orderly and efficient capital markets.”). 
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A. Promoting Efficient Capital Markets 
 
The concept of “efficient capital markets” includes informational efficiency (market 
mechanisms able to process new information quickly and with broad distribution)
11
 and allocative 
efficiency (distributing capital resources to their highest value use at the lowest cost and risk).
12
 
Disclosure is obviously relevant to both efficiency goals, the latter being particularly relevant to 
the discussion of the need for better sustainability disclosure. As Mark Carney, Governor of the 
Bank of England and Chair of the Financial Stability Board, said with respect to climate change, 
with “consistent, comparable, reliable, and clear disclosure” of firms’ forward-looking strategies, 
both “markets and governments” can better manage the transition to a low-carbon future by 
supporting the allocation of capital to its risk-adjusted highest-value use in that transition.
13
 
Climate change is not a purely environmental issue, of course: It is also an issue that poses 
material risks and opportunities to companies in most industries. The Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board (“SASB”)’s conclusion, developed in conjunction with industry leaders, is that 
72 of 79 industries, representing 93% of U.S. capital market valuations, are vulnerable to 
material financial implications from climate change.
14
 The point is that without consistent, 
comparable, reliable, and complete information, capital markets are constrained in promoting 
allocational efficiency as many industries embark on the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
Similarly, other substantial social and economic challenges in the United States, such as 
increasingly precarious work environments, rising economic inequality, or the security of private 
information, can be better perceived by investors and assets allocated to high-performance 
workplaces and firms with better human capital management and cybersecurity arrangements if 
investors are provided with clear and comparable information about these matters.  
 
Requiring firms to disclose more ESG information is thus consistent with the SEC’s 
authority to promote market efficiency, and within its broad mandate “to promulgate rules for 





B.  Ensuring the global competitiveness of America’s public companies and the U.S. 
capital markets 
 
     The SEC will also be ensuring the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets and America’s 
public companies by requiring more ESG disclosure. Many other developed countries have 
already promulgated such requirements, shaping the expectations of global investors. A 2016 
study by the U.N. PRI (Principles for Responsible Investment) and MSCI (a global data and 
investment research provider) identified 300 policy initiatives promoting sustainable finance in 
the world’s 50 largest economies, of which 200 were corporate reporting requirements covering 
                                                     
11
 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK L.REV. 763, 764–65 (1995).  
12
 See Alicia J. Davis, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2009) (recognizing that 
“[p]ublic markets perform a vital economic role, since accurate share prices lead to the efficient allocation of 
capital.”).  
13
 Mark Carney, Governor, Breaking the tragedy of the horizon: Climate change and financial stability, Bank of 
England 14 (Sept. 29, 2015), available at 
http://www.BankofEngland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/844.asp#.  
14
 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Climate Risk—Technical Bulletin, SASB Library 2017, available at 
https://library.sasb.org/climate-risk-technical-bulletin/.  
15
 Concept Release, supra note 3, at 22. 
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environmental, social, and governance factors.
16
 According to a 2015 report by the Initiative for 
Responsible Investment of the Hauser Institute for Civil Society at the Kennedy School, Harvard 
University, 23 countries have enacted legislation within the last 15 years to require public 




In addition to these reporting initiatives, seven stock exchanges require social and/or 
environmental disclosure as part of their listing requirements: Australia’s ASX, Brazil’s 
Bovespa, India’s Securities and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malaysia, Oslo’s Børs, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and the London Stock Exchange.
18
  
Moreover, seven countries have enacted policies following those of the U.K. and Sweden, 
which since 2000 have required public pension funds to disclose the extent to which the fund 
incorporates social and environmental information into their investment decisions.
19
 Regulations 
such as these support the trend of increasing institutional investor demand for high-quality ESG 
data, as discussed below. Currently the European Union is developing a taxonomy of 
environmentally sustainable activities, as well as developing benchmarks for low-carbon 
investment strategies, and regulatory guidance to improve corporate disclosure of climate-related 
information.
20
 To the extent that US companies fail to disclose information which global 
investors are being encouraged, and in some cases required, to consider, they will be at a 
disadvantage in attracting capital from some of the world’s largest financial markets.  This 
highlights that US corporate reporting standards will soon become outdated if they are not 
revised to incorporate global developments regarding the materiality and disclosure of ESG 
information.  
 
 C. Facilitating Capital Formation 
 
Additionally, promulgating a regulatory framework for the disclosure of ESG information 
would promote capital formation. By providing more information to investors, giving better 
information about risks and opportunities, and standardizing what is currently an uncoordinated 
and irregular universe of ESG disclosures, the SEC would act to increase confidence in the 
capital markets. This confidence may well mobilize sources of capital from investors who are 
currently unwilling to invest given knowledge gaps or information asymmetries. Particularly 
retail investors, who are important as long-term investors and investors in small and medium 
enterprises, may be emboldened by a clearer sense of the social and environmental aspects of 
                                                     
16
 PRI and MSCI, Global Guide to Responsible Investment Regulation, 2016, available at 
https://www.unpri.org/page/responsible-investment-regulation. 
17
 See Initiative for Responsible Investment, Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National 
Governments and Stock Exchanges (March 12, 2015), available at http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/CR-3-12-15.pdf. These countries include Argentina, China, Denmark, the EU, Ecuador, 
Finland, France, Germany Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland (specific to state-supported financial 
institutions after the 2008 financial crisis), Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Taiwan, and the U.K. 
18
 See id. 
19
 See Initiative for Responsible Investment report, supra note 63. These countries include Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. 




companies’ activities as a guide to companies’ longer-term risks and opportunities.
21
 As we 
highlight below, the value of assets under management based on ESG-influenced guidelines has 
grown considerably in the past two decades. We ask the SEC to act to facilitate the provision of 
information to this rapidly growing sector. In so doing, additional capital may become available 
to support America’s enterprises, particularly its smaller and medium-sized enterprises. 
 
2. ESG Information is Material and Decision Useful 
 
In advancing its over-arching goals of investor protection and promoting market efficiency, 
the SEC has relied upon the concept of materiality to determine what information issuers should 
be required to disclose and in what format.
22
 As defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in TSC v. 
Northway, material information is information that a “reasonable shareholder would consider 
important in deciding how to vote.”
23
 As the Court said, “[p]ut another way, there must be a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”
24 
Thus, what is material depends on reasonable investors’ perceptions of what 
information is already available in the market, and how any new or omitted information changes 
those perceptions of the quality of management, when voting or engaging with management, or 
the value of a company or its shares, when investing or selling.  
 
In promulgating disclosure regulations under Regulation S-K, the SEC has predominantly, 
but not exclusively, sought to require the disclosure of information it construes as financially 
material.
25 
Recent investment industry analyses are confirming the financial materiality of much 
ESG information. For instance, a June, 2017, Bank of America Merrill Lynch study highlighted 
by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board found sustainability factors to be “strong 
indicators of future volatility, earnings risk, price declines, and bankruptcies.”
26
 Also in June of 
2017, Allianz Global Investors produced a research report with similar findings, concluding that 
the heightened transparency of ESG disclosure lowered companies’ cost of capital by reducing 
the “investment risk premium” that sophisticated investors would require.
27
 In September of 
2017, Nordea Equity Research published an analytic research report concluding that there is 
“solid evidence that ESG matters, both for operational and share price performance.”
28
 Goldman 
Sachs concluded in April of 2018 that “integrating ESG factors allows for greater insight into 
                                                     
21
 See Davis, supra note 12, at 116-1120 for evidence on the importance of retail investors to small and medium 
enterprises, versus institutional investors which predominantly invest in large-capitalization companies; and for 
evidence of retail investors generally longer holding periods for shares of stock. 
22
 Concept Release, supra note 3, at 33-34. 
23
 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
24
 Id.  
25
 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1264-66 (1999) (discussing SEC’s requirements for public companies to disclose certain 
corporate governance information without a showing of economic materiality). 
26
 Bank of American Merrill Lynch, Equity Strategy Focus Point—ESG Part II: A Deeper Dive (June 15, 2017), 
cited in Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), The State of Disclosure Report 2017 (December 2017).  
27
 Allianz Global Investors, ESG matters, Part 2: Added value or a mere marketing tool?What does ESG mean for 
investments?, (June 2017).  
28









These industry studies are consistent with, and indeed rely upon, a number of influential 
academic studies that have analyzed the over 2,000 research studies also showing the economic 
materiality of ESG information. Two such studies are of particular note. Deutsch Asset & Wealth 
Management, in conjunction with researchers from the University of Hamburg, analyzed 2,250 
individual studies of the relationship between ESG data and corporate financial performance. 
From this analysis, the researchers concluded that improvements in ESG performance generally 
lead to improvements in financial performance.
30
 A comprehensive review published in 2015 of 
empirical studies found that 90% of studies show that sound sustainability standards lower firms’ 
cost of capital; 80% of studies show that companies’ stock price performance is positively 
influenced by good sustainability practices; and 88% of studies show that better E, S, or G 
practices result in better operational performance.
31
   
 
In addition, the SEC has promulgated disclosure requirements for the production of 
qualitatively material information. For instance, it has required disclosure concerning corporate 
governance, such as statistics on board members’ attendance at meetings, and information on the 
committee structure of the board of directors, with the stated purpose of encouraging the board to 
be more active and independent in monitoring management’s actions.
32
 It has required extensive 
disclosure of executive compensation, starting in the early 1990s, as a response to public 
frustration with the levels of executive compensation.
33 
Indeed, with respect to illegal actions by 
members of management or the company, the SEC has established an almost per se materiality 
standard even where the economic consequences of management’s illegal actions were trivial.
34
 
This qualitative approach to the materiality of information concerning the honesty of 
management or its approach to law compliance, among other matters, was the basis for the 
SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant to reject 
                                                     
29 Goldman Sachs Equity Research, GS Sustain ESG Series: A Revolution Rising-From Low Chatter to Loud Roar 
[Redacted], 23 April 2018 (analyzing earnings call transcripts, social media, asset manager initiatives, and rising 
assets under management utilizing ESG screens to conclude that “the ESG Revolution is just beginning, as the 
logical, empirical and anecdotal evidence for its importance continue to mount.”).  
30
 Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management, ESG and Corporate Financial Performance: Mapping the Global 




 See Gordon L. Clark, Andreas Feiner & Michael Viehs, From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How 
Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance (2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508281. This report is an excellent resource because it analyzes 
the empirical literature on the financial effects of sustainability initiatives by type of initiative (E, S or G) and by 
various financial measures of interest (cost of debt capital; cost of equity capital; operating performance; and effect 
on stock prices). 
32
 See Williams, supra note 24, at 1265 & fn. 359, citing Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in 
the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, 16 Docket 
348 (Dec. 6, 1978).  
33
 See id. at 1266 & fn. 363, citing Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange 
Act Release No. 31,327, 52 SEC Docket 1961 (Nov. 4, 1992). 
34
 See id. at 1265 & fn. 361, citing Division of Corporation Finance’s Views and Comments on Disclosure Relating 
to the Making of Illegal Campaign Contributions by Public Companies and/or their Officers and Directors, 
Securities Act Release No. 5466, Exchange Act Release No. 10673, 3 SEC Docket 647 (Mar. 19, 1974); In re 









The Commission has often developed new disclosure requirements in response to increased 
investor interest in emerging systemic environmental or social risks, such as its 2011 guidance 
on disclosure of risks related to cybersecurity.
36
 We thus conclude that the SEC properly 
recognizes that there can be material information which is not yet required to be reflected in 
financial statements but which may be decision-relevant to investors. As stated by Alan Beller, 
former Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, “[i]n today’s rapidly changing business 
landscape, investors often look beyond financial statement to understand how companies create 
long-term value.  Financial reporting today has not kept pace with both company managers and 
investors’ interest in broader categories of information that are also material to operations and 
financial performance.” 
37
 The touchstone is the “reasonable investor,” and what information the 
reasonable investor relies upon in voting, investing, and engagement with portfolio companies.   
 
Today, investors with $68.4 trillion of capital are committed to incorporating ESG factors in 
their investing and voting decisions as part of the U.N. PRI.
38
 Institutions, pension funds, 
sovereign wealth funds, and mutual funds with $95 trillion of invested capital support the Carbon 
Disclosure Project’s (“CDP”) annual survey of global companies regarding their greenhouse gas 
emissions and strategies for addressing climate change.
39
 According to a recent Ernst & Young 
report, “investor interest in non-financial information spans across all sectors,” and 61.5% of 




Global assets under management utilizing sustainability screens, ESG factors, and 
comparable SRI corporate engagement strategies were valued at $22.89 trillion at the start of 
2016, comprising 26% of all professionally managed assets globally.
41
 Moreover, U.S.-
domiciled assets using SRI strategies in 2016 were valued at $8.72 trillion, comprising more 
than 21% of the assets under professional management in the U.S. in that year.
42
 These latter 
data starkly contrast with the facts when the SEC last considered the issue of expanded social 
and environmental disclosure in comprehensive fashion, between 1971 and 1975. Then, there 
were two active “ethical funds” in the United States, which by 1975 collectively held only 




The data in the last two paragraphs indicate that substantial assets under management are 
                                                     
35
 See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99-Materiality (Aug. 12, 1999). 
36
 Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Topic No. 2 
Cybersecurity (Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. 
37 Alan Beller, Foreword to SASB’s Inaugural Annual State of Disclosure Report, December 1, 2016, available at 
https://www.sasb.org/blog-alan-beller-pens-forward-inaugural-annual-state-disclosure-report.  
38
 See PRI-11 year growth of AO, all signatories (Asset Owners, Investment Managers and service providers) and 
respective AUM, Excel sheet available for download at About the PRI, U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment, 
http://www.unpri.org/about. 
39
 Catalyzing business and government action, Carbon Disclosure project, https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/About-
Us.aspx.  
40
 Id. at 18.  
41 See Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, The Global Sustainable Investment Review 2016 3, 7-8, available at 
http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GSIA_Review_2016.pdf.  
42 Sustainable and Impact Investing in the United States: Overview, US SIF, 
http://www.ussif.org/files/Infographics/Overview%20Infographic.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).  
43
 See Williams, supra note 24, at 1267 (citing SEC data). 
 
 9 
using what ESG data is available, clearly demonstrating that investors consider this 
information material.
44
 And yet, as discussed below, leading U.S. asset managers and 
executives emphasize that the poor quality of ESG data does not meet investors’ needs, and 
support regulatory mandates to require companies to produce better ESG data.   
 
3. Companies struggle to provide investors with ESG information that is relevant, 
reliable, and decision-useful 
 
Over the last twenty-five years, voluntary disclosure of ESG information, and voluntary 
frameworks for that disclosure, have proliferated to meet the demands for information from 
investors, consumers, and civil society. The most comprehensive source of data on ESG 
reporting is that done by KPMG in the Netherlands. KPMG published its first ESG report in 
1993, and its most recent report in 2017. In 1993, 12% of the top 100 companies in the OECD 
countries (excluding Japan) published an environmental or social report.
45
 By 2017, 83% of the 
top 100 companies in the Americas publish a corporate responsibility report, as do 77% of top 
100 companies in Europe and 78% in Asia.
46
 Of the largest 250 companies globally, reporting 
rates are 93%.
47
 The Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) voluntary, multi-stakeholder framework 
for ESG reporting has emerged as the clear global benchmark: 75% of the Global 250 use GRI as 
the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting.48 Of particular note, 67% of the Global 250 




Although 75% of the Global 250 use GRI as the basis for reporting, academic studies of 
reporting according to GRI have found serious problems with the quality of the information 
being disclosed. One study comparing GRI reports in the automotive industry concluded that 
“the information . . . is of limited practical use . . .Thus, quantitative data are not always gathered 
systematically and reported completely, while qualitative information appears unbalanced.”
50
 
Markus Milne, Amanda Ball, and Rob Gray surveyed the existing literature on GRI as a 
preeminent example of triple bottom line reporting, and concluded in 2013 that “the quality—
and especially the completeness—of many triple bottom line reports are not high. . . With a few 
notable exceptions, the reports cover few stakeholders, cherry pick elements of news, and 
generally ignore the major social issues that arise from corporate activity….”
51
 Other studies 
have observed similar problems, particularly with the lack of comparability of the information 
                                                     
44 For further evidence of investors’ views on the materiality of ESG data, see Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability 
Disclosure Sustainable, GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233053. 
45
 See Ans Kolk, A Decade of Sustainability Reporting: Developments and Significance, 3 INT’L J. ENVIR. & 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 51, 52 Figure 1 (2004). KPMG has changed the format of the report since its original 
1993 report, so direct comparisons are not possible between the Global 250 in 1993 and the Global 250 in 2017.  
46
 KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2017, at 11, available at 




 See id. at 28. The Global Reporting Initiative is now in its fourth iteration. It has been developed by, and is used 
by, thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around the world to report on the economic, 
environmental, social and governance effects of entities’ actions. See Global Reporting Initiative, available at 
http://www.globalreporting.org. 
49
 See KPMG 2017 Report, supra note 42, at 26. 
50
 Klaus Dingwerth & Margot Eichinger, Tamed Transparency: How Information Disclosure under the Global 
Reporting Initiative fails to Empower, 10:3 GLOBAL ENV. POL. 74, 88 (2010).  
51
 Markus J. Milne, Amanda Ball & Rob Gray, Wither Ecology? The Triple Bottom Line, the Global Reporting 





 These conclusions should not be taken as a criticism of GRI per se, or of 
companies’ efforts to provide expanded ESG information. Rather, these conclusions are an 
indication of the weaknesses of voluntary disclosure: without a regulatory mandate, the 
information being produced is often incomplete, lacks consistency, and is not comparable 
between companies. In contrast, when ESG disclosure becomes mandatory, standards become 
clearer and reporting becomes more consistent and comparable.
53
 In analogous circumstances, 
the SEC has recognized the importance of standardized disclosure frameworks for financial 
information, expressing concerns about the use of non-GAAP accounting, concluding that 
information being disclosed without adherence to the standardized disclosure framework of U.S. 




4. Companies’ Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient to Meet Investors’ Needs 
 
Given these problems with the quality of voluntary ESG disclosure, notwithstanding the 
efforts of public companies to meet investors’ needs, a wide range of capital market 
participants have come out in favor of required ESG disclosure. In response to the Concept 
Release, the SEC received comments from asset managers, institutional investors, individual 
investors, foundation executives, and public pension funds, among others. These users of 
corporate disclosure “overwhelmingly expressed support” for more required ESG disclosure.
55
 
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, with assets under management of $6.317 
trillion as of March 31, 2018, has recognized the strategic value of ESG information: 
 
Environmental, social, and governance issues are integral to our investment stewardship 
activities, as the majority of our clients are saving for long-term goals. It is over the 
long-term that ESG factors – ranging from climate change to diversity to board 
effectiveness – have real and quantifiable financial impacts. Our risk analysis extends 





And yet, BlackRock asserts that current reporting practices are insufficient for the kinds of 
in-depth investment analysis that it seeks with its ESG integration, making it “difficult to 
identify investment decision-useful data.” As a result, it has advocated for public policy 
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BlackRock is not alone among substantial asset owners and asset managers advocating for 
better ESG disclosure in required securities filings. As discussed in Section Four, below, the 
Human Capital Management Coalition, a group of 25 institutional investors representing $2.8 
trillion in assets, has submitted a rulemaking petition to the Commission urging the adoption of 
standards that would require listed companies to disclose information on human capital 
management policies, practices, and performance.
58
 In July 2017, 390 investors representing 
more than $22 trillion in assets wrote to G20 heads of state, calling on governments to “evolve 





 Bloomberg, another global company that sells capital markets data, has reached conclusions 
similar to those of BlackRock about the quality of ESG data. Since 2009, Bloomberg has 
incorporated ESG data into the data that it sells to dealers, brokers, and investors around the 
world.
60
 Even so, its CEO Michael Bloomberg has said this: 
 
[F]or the most part, the sustainability information that is disclosed by corporations today 
is not useful for investors or other decision-makers. . . .To help address this issue, I 
became chair of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) in 2014, and last 
year [2015], I agreed to build on that work by chairing the new Task Force on Climate-
Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD)….The market cannot accurately value companies, 
and investors cannot efficiently allocate capital, without comparable, reliable and useful 




The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) was constituted by the 
Financial Stability Board, under the auspices of the G20.
62
 It has now released its final 
recommendations for a framework of climate-relevant financial disclosure, focusing on four 
aspects of a company’s operations in respect of climate change: Governance, Strategy, Risk 
Management, and Metrics & Targets.
63
 Among what the TCFD calls its “key recommendations” 
is that climate-related financial disclosures should be included in required financial filings, thus 
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 The Task Force, chaired by Michael R. Bloomberg, was established by the FSB in December 2015 pursuant to a 
request from Bank of England Governor Mark Carney “to develop a set of voluntary disclosure recommendations 
for use by companies in providing information to investors, lenders and insurance underwriters about their climate-
related financial risks.” See https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/news/#. 
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 See Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, June 2017, at iii, available at 






Notwithstanding the problems with the quality of voluntarily produced ESG information in 
the markets, the substantial growth in voluntary sustainability disclosure globally is important for 
a number of reasons. First, companies are responding to investors who are increasingly aware of 
the relevance of ESG data to a full evaluation of company strategies, risks, and opportunities. 
This investor awareness shows the materiality of this information, particularly to shareholders 
with a long-term orientation. Second, to produce sustainability reports companies have 
developed internal procedures to collect and evaluate the kinds of information that an SEC 
framework would likely require, thus showing that costs to companies should not be an 
impediment. While not all companies have embarked on sustainability reporting, therefore 
adoption will include some additional costs to some companies, the SEC is well-positioned to 
provide “on-ramps” or differentiated requirements for smaller companies, as it has done 
historically. Third, and perhaps most important, twenty-five years of development of voluntary 
sustainability disclosure has not led to the production of consistent, comparable, highly-reliable 
ESG information in the market, notwithstanding the voluntary, multi-stakeholder development of 
a framework for disclosure (GRI) that is being used by 75% of the world’s largest companies. 
SEC leadership providing a mandate for ESG disclosure in the world’s largest, and arguably 
most important, capital market can significantly contribute to solving this problem.  
 
5. Commission rulemaking will reduce the current burden on public companies and 
provide a level playing field for the many American companies engaging in voluntary 
ESG disclosure 
  
 In addition to benefiting investors, rulemaking regarding ESG disclosure would benefit 
America’s public companies by providing clarity to them about what, when and how to disclose 
material sustainability information. Today companies are burdened with meeting a range of 
investor expectations for sustainability information without clear standards about how to do so. 
A number of promising frameworks have been promulgated over the previous decade or decades, 
many of which have been mentioned in this petition: GRI, SASB, CDP, and now TCFD being 
the most prominent. And yet, because there isn’t clear guidance and an authoritative standard in 
the U. S. for all public reporting companies to use, different companies are using different 
frameworks and multiple mechanisms to disclose sustainability information. Thus, investors are 





 That ESG disclosure requirements could actually reduce burdens on America’s public 
companies was well-stated in the CFA Institute’s Comment Letter to the Concept Release: 
 
Many issuers already provide lengthy sustainability or ESG reports to their investors, so 
many issuers will not face a new and burdensome cost by collecting, verifying and 
disclosing ESG information. Costs may be saved if instead of producing large 
sustainability reports that cover a broad range of sustainability information, issuers can 
instead focus on only collecting, verifying and disclosing information concerning the 
factors that are material to them and their investors.
66
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 Such rulemaking would also act to create a level playing field between companies. 
Today, sustainability information is being provided by some but not all companies, in formats 
that differ, using different mechanisms for disclosure (sustainability reports, company websites, 
SEC filings), and different timing. As recognized in an analysis of sustainability reporting by 
PwC in 2016, this has created a situation where information is not comparable between 
companies in the same industry and sector; where “an increasing volume of information is being 
provided without linkage to a company’s core strategy,” and where there are no clear standards 
all companies within the same industry are using.
67
 Such standards could well encompass a mix 
of required elements, based on industry and sector; information about firms’ governance of 
sustainability issues across industries; and principles-based elements to act as a materiality back-
stop. By providing clarity to issuers on what sustainability disclosure is required, the SEC would 
create comparability between firms in the same industry, thus promoting a level playing field 
between companies. Comparability will allow actual sustainability leaders to be recognized as 




6. Various ESG-related Petitions and Stakeholder Engagements with the SEC Suggest, in 
Aggregate, that it is Time for the SEC to Act to Bring Coherence to this Area 
 
In recent years, there have been a number of significant petitions and other investor proposals 
seeking expanded disclosure of ESG information. These initiatives give evidence of the views of 
investors and capital markets professionals that more needs to be done to meet investors’ needs 
for consistent, comparable, and high-quality ESG data. Moreover, stakeholders have used 
additional opportunities created by the SEC to support for broader ESG disclosure. A sampling 
of such petitions, investor proposals, and stakeholder engagements includes: 
 
Climate Risk Disclosure: In 2007 and 2009, Ceres filed petitions to the SEC calling for better 
guidance to companies on how to disclose risks and opportunities from climate change. In 2010, 
the SEC responded by issuing such guidance.
69
 Analysis indicates that the guidance has not been 
successful in producing consistent, comparable, high-quality information concerning climate 
change risks and opportunities, however.
70
 The Framework and Technical Guidance published 
                                                                                                                                                                           
investment professionals in more than 157 countries. On the question of the SEC requiring sustainability disclosure, 
the CFA Institute concluded that “[i]t is imperative that the SEC develop disclosure requirements that require 
companies to disclose material sustainability information while allowing issuers the flexibility to disclose that which 
is germane to their industry/sector . . . “  Thus the Institute supported differentiated sustainability disclosure 
according to industry and sector, along with a general requirement for companies to disclose the corporate 
governance arrangements for sustainability issues. Id. 
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by the FSB’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD), mentioned above, 
would be an industry-developed (operating companies, investors, insurance companies, and 
accounting) platform for the SEC to use as a starting point in promulgating its own Framework 
for comprehensive ESG disclosure. 
 
ESG Disclosure: On July 21, 2009, the U.S. Social Investment Forum (USSIF) requested that 
the SEC promulgate a new, annual requirement for ESG disclosure, modeled on the framework 
of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). GRI sets out a general framework for disclosure of 
information applicable to all companies, and then industry-specific requirements relevant to the 
social, environmental, and governance concerns applicable to each specific industry. The USSIF 
petition also asked the SEC to issue interpretive guidance to clarify that companies are required 
to disclose short and long-term sustainability risks in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
section of their 10-K. 
 
Gender pay ratios: On February 1, 2016, Pax Ellevate Management LLC, investment adviser 
to the Pax Ellevate Global Women’s Index Fund submitted a petition to the Commission 
requesting that it require public companies to disclose gender pay ratios on an annual basis. 
Petitioners stated that “[w]e believe that pay equity is a useful and material indicator of well-
managed, well-governed companies, and conversely, that companies exhibiting significant 
gender pay disparities may bear disproportionate risk, and that investors therefore may benefit 




Human Capital Management: On July 6, 2017, the Human Capital Management Coalition, a 
group of institutional investors with $2.8 trillion in assets, submitted a petition to the 
Commission requesting that it “adopt new rules, or amend existing rules, to require issuers to 
disclose information about their human capital management policies, practices and 
performance.”
72
 The Coalition seeks this expanded disclosure so that “(1) investors can 
adequately assess a company’s business, risks and prospects; (2) investors can more “efficiently 
direct capital to its highest value use, thus lowering the cost of capital for well-managed 
companies; (3) companies can stop responding to a myriad of voluntary questionnaires seeking 
this information; and (4) investors can pursue long-term investing strategies in order “to stabilize 
and improve our markets and to effect the efficient allocation of capital.” 
 
Human Rights: The human rights policies, practices, and impacts of filers are material to 
many investors.
73
 The SEC has already provided for some human rights disclosure regarding 
conflict minerals under 17 CFR §240.13p-1, in response to the Dodd-Frank Act, and in certain 
guidance on disclosure relating to climate change
74
 and cyber-security information.
75
 General 
guidance on disclosure of human rights policies, practices, and impacts is lacking, however.  
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In responding to the 2016 Concept Release, a number of stakeholders provided comments on the 
value of increased disclosure about a number of human rights issues. These comments 
highlighted the need for better information about the impacts of companies on the human rights 
of affected communities, but also discussed human rights impacts related to the environment, 
climate change, human capital, and workforce issues. Over 10,000 commenters raised issues 
within these different substantive areas.
76
 Additionally, in relation to Conflict Minerals rule, 
when Acting Chairman Piwowar announced the SEC’s reconsideration of the rule’s 
implementation in January 2017, the Commission received over 11,500 comments in support of 




Political Spending Disclosure: On August 3, 2011, the Committee on Disclosure of 
Corporate Political Spending (ten academics at leading law schools whose teaching and research 
focus on corporate and securities law), petitioned the Commission to develop rules to require 
public companies to “disclose to shareholders the use of corporate resources for political 
activities.”
78
 Recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010), noted shareholder mechanisms to hold management to account for its use of corporate 
funds to support political candidates, the petitioners argued that for that mechanism to work, 
“shareholders must have information about the company’s political speech.”
79
 To date, this 




 Tax Disclosure: In its April 2016 Concept Release the SEC asked about what, if 
anything, should be changed, updated, included or removed regarding tax disclosure.  The 
Comment Letter submitted by the Financial Accountability and Corporate Transparency (FACT) 
Coalition emphasized that the role played by international tax strategies and rates on the 
operations and earnings of many U.S. corporations is important and growing.  The letter 
highlighted the risks to investors created by these at best uncertain and often legally problematic 
strategies. Given the scope of fines and risks arising from tax jurisdictions around the world, 
investors need more information to be able to evaluate the scope of tax risks tht the company is 
running. Moreover, the new tax law in the U.S. moves the U.S. to a territorial tax system, which 
will open up further uncertainties and risks related to how and where revenues are booked.    
 
The IRS recently finalized a rule to require country-by-country reporting of revenues, profits, 
taxes paid and certain operations by larger multinational corporations. The European Union has 
also established new country-by-country reporting requirements for larger firms doing business 
in any of the member nations. Increasingly, tax authorities have access to this material 
information, as do company managers, yet investors do not. The growing use of offshore tax 
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strategies, the international response to rein in aggressive tax avoidance, and the potential tax 
liability for corporations engaged in these practices makes this information material for 
investors.  
     
These petitions, in conjunction with the large numbers of comments in support of expanded 
sustainability disclosure in response to the SEC’s Concept Release, clearly show that investors 
and capital market professionals think the time has come for the SEC to act to develop a 
mandatory rule for clearer, consistent, comparable, high-quality ESG disclosure by all companies 




We respectfully request the Commission to promptly initiate rulemaking to develop 
mandatory rules for public companies to disclose high-quality, comparable, decision-useful 
environmental, social, and governance information. If the Commission or Staff have any 
questions, or if we can be of assistance in any way, please contact either Osler Chair in 
Business Law Cynthia A. Williams, Osgoode Hall Law School, who can be reached at (416) 
736-5545, or by electronic mail at cwilliams@osgoode.yorku.ca; or Saul A. Fox Distinguished 
Professor of Business Law Jill E. Fisch, University of Pennsylvania Law School, who can be 




Cynthia A. Williams  
Osler Chair in Business Law 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
York University 
 
Jill E. Fisch 
Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of 
Business Law  
University of Pennsylvania Law School  




Additional signatories include:  
 
Euan Stirling, Global Head of Stewardship & ESG Investing, Aberdeen Standard Investments 
Amalgamated Bank 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 
Natasha Lamb, Managing Partner, Arjuna Capital  
As You Sow 
Boston Common Asset Management, LLC. 
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) 
John Streur, Chief Executive Officer, Calvert Research and Management 
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Jim Coburn, Senior Manager, Disclosure, Ceres 
Clean Yield Asset Management 
Congregation of Sisters of St. Agnes 
CtW Investment Group 
Degas Wright, CFA, CEO/CIO, Decatur Capital Management, Inc. 
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli  
Domini Impact Investments LLC 
Holly A. Testa, Director, Shareowner Engagement, First Affirmative Financial Network 
Illinois State Treasurer Michael W. Frerichs 
Jeffery W. Perkins, Executive Director, Friends Fiduciary Corporation 
The Fund for Constitutional Government 
Green Century Capital Management 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility  
Rabbi Joshua Ratner, Director of Advocacy, JLens Investor Network 
JUST Capital 
Clare Payn, Head of Corporate Governance North America, Legal & General Investment 
 Management 
Luan Jenifer, Chief Operating Officer, Miller/Howard Investments, Inc. 
The Missionary Oblates/ OIP 
Morningstar, Inc.  
Connecticut State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier 
The Nathan Cummings Foundation 
Natural Investments LLC 
Bruce T. Herbert, AIF, Chief Executive, Newground Social Investment  
NorthStar Asset Management, Inc. 
Joseph F. Keefe, President, Pax World Funds 
Province of Saint Joseph of the Capuchin Order (SJP) 
Oregon State Treasurer Tobias Read 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
School Sisters of Notre Dame Cooperative Investment Fund 
Jeffrey S. Davis, Executive Director, Seattle City Employees’ Retirement System 
Frank Sherman, Executive Director, Seventh Generation Interfaith Inc. 
Sanford Lewis, Director, Shareholder Rights Group 
 
 18 
The Sustainability Group of Loring, Wolcott & Coolidge 
Trillium Asset Management, LLC. 
Trinity Health 
Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment 
U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment  
US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment 
Timothy Smith, Walden Asset Management/Boston Trust 
Wallace Global Fund 
Zevin Asset Management, LLC. 
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